Normative and descriptive aspects in cognitive science
Since 2022 I have been working in a joint project with Ulrike Hahn on the interplay between descriptive models and normative models. In its more empirical part, the work considers the ability of humans to correctly learn from probabilistic information, especially conditional probabilities. The theoretical part considers the interplay between normative and descriptive questions in cognitive science from a philosophical perspective. The first papers on this work were published in the proceedings of the cognitive science society in 2023. Further publications are expected in 2024.

  • Strößner, C. & Hahn, U. (2023): “How Well Do Humans Learn Conditional Probabilities?”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45,
  • Strößner, C. (2023): “Hybrid frameworks of reasoning: normative-descriptive interplay”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45,

Conceptual spaces, frames and natural concepts
Conceptual spaces are best known for representing perceptual concepts, while frames are often applied for representing more complex concepts. The main idea of my project is to provide a unified framework that combines the advantages of frames and conceptual spaces. Particularly, the framework was applied to the question of what makes concepts natural (i.e., salient in cognition, useful in induction etc.).

Prototypes, frames and default inheritance
This project deals with the transmission of typical properties from categories to subcategories, for example from "Ravens are typically black" to "Young ravens are typically black". The project included experimental work as well as formal models based on frames (attribute-value structures). The research was published in peer-reviewed papers:

Logical aspects of conceptual change, incommensurability
Most logical systems and other formal systems of belief representation assume a fixed language and conceptual system. The ambition of my research is to extend existing frameworks of belief revision (in particular dynamic epistemic logic) by conceptual learning and conceptual change and to apply it to cases of conceptual change in the sciences. 

Statistical interpretation of normality statements
This was my PhD project. It addresses the relation between normality statements (e.g., "Birds can normally fly") and statistical statements (e.g., "Most birds can fly" or "Most birds can mostly fly"). I argue in favour of a partially statistical reading of normality. The research resulted in a thesis, which appeared as a book (in German): 

  • Strößner, C. (2014) Die Logik der Normalität: Untersuchungen zur Semantik von Normalitätsurteilen, LOGOS De Gruyter

Related research was published in the following articles:

Square of opposition and Universal Logic
The structure of the square of opposition is widely applicable in traditional and modern logic. I discussed it within a many-valued relevance logic as well as with respect to Aristotelian logic:

  • Strößner, C. (2020) “Existential import, Aristotelian logic, and its generalizations”.
    Logica Universalis (14) ,
  • Strößner, C. & Strobach, N. (2012) “Veridications and their square of opposition”.
    In Béziau J.-Y. and Payette G. (eds.), New perspectives on the square of opposition.
    Peter Lang Bern

Formal epistemology
I published a paper on how probabilistic and logical norms contribute to rational improvement of beliefs: 

Generalized theory of evolution
Evolutionary arguments play an important role in the above-mentioned project on normality but they are also an interesting field of research in themselves. After co-organising an international conference, I co-edited a special issue on the subject:

  • Feldbacher-Escamilla, C., Baraghith, K. & Strößner, C. (2021): The Generalized
    Theory of Evolution,
    special issue of the American Philosophical Quarterly,

An interview about the special issue can be found here.